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3 Subsequent decisions
3.1 Introduction
Even when he first identified the arbitrariness vortex, Roux pointed out that 
courts may well not follow the methodology set out in the FNB case strictly and 
that deviations might reduce the vortex effect in some cases. In some subsequent 
decisions, the constitutional court did follow its approach in the FNB case, but it has 
become clear that the arbitrariness vortex is not going to materialise in a pure form 
or consistently and that the court will indeed deviate from the FNB methodology 
in ways that will at least water the vortex effect down. Perhaps more surprisingly, 
subsequent decisions have also shown that the court will deviate from the FNB 
methodology in ways that might create new vortices, centred on other parts of the 
section 25 inquiry.
It is impossible in this article to analyse all the relevant constitutional court 
decisions on section 25, let alone decisions from other courts. In what follows 
the approach is rather to select for discussion a few decisions, mostly from the 
constitutional court, that illustrate the points on which the court either more or less 
followed its FNB approach or deviated from it.
3.2 Beneficiaries 
Since the court in the FNB case decided that a corporate juristic person does enjoy 
the protection of section 25, the beneficiaries issue has not come up for decision too 
often. In City of Tshwane
62
 the court confirmed, for the first time in South African 
law,63 that section 25 protects private property and that the state cannot, as a property 
owner, claim its protection. This does not mean that the constitution denies the 
state’s right to own property, but since either deprivation or expropriation of state 
property that triggers section 25 protection could arise only from state regulation 
of property, one state organ cannot rely on the bill of rights to protect its property 
against regulatory action by another. If “deprivation” or “expropriation” issues 
should arise between different tiers or organs of government respectively owning 
property and regulating its use, the ensuing conflicts should be resolved in terms 
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62 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 6 SA 440 (CC). See further 
on the City of Tshwane decision Van der Walt “Constitutional property law” 2015 ASSAL.
63 This principle is also applied, with further refinements, in foreign law; see eg Van der Walt (n 24) 
71-72 (German law).
2016 (4) TSAR 597
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
TSAR 2016 . 4 [ISSN 0257 – 7747]
598 VAN DER WALT
of chapter 3 of the constitution (co-operative government) and not chapter 2 (bill of 
rights). In the City of Tshwane case the section 25 challenge was therefore restricted 
to the private intervening party (SMI Trading CC) whose property was affected by 
installations established under section 22 of the Electronic Communications Act 36 
of 2005. This decision was based on an analysis of the constitutional context and 
function of section 25 and not influenced by the arbitrariness vortex.64
The beneficiaries issue also came up, indirectly and in a way that implicates 
Roux’s vortex thesis, in the Shoprite Checkers case.65 The fact that the beneficiaries 
issue raised its head in this decision at all was somewhat surprising, seeing that 
the question was the same fairly straightforward one already decided in the FNB 
case, namely whether a corporate juristic person (in this case Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd) was entitled to the property rights protection offered by section 25. The 
court accepted that Shoprite had standing to bring a constitutional challenge under 
section 25, provided that it could show the presence of a protected property interest. 
For purposes of this qualification, the court defined a protected property interest 
as one that promotes “socially-situated individual self-fulfilment”.66 Obviously, 
property can in principle only promote individual self-fulfilment in natural persons, 
which indirectly but effectively restricts the beneficiaries of section 25 protection 
with reference to the court’s individual-self-fulfilment definition of property. In a 
roundabout way, proof of a protected property interest therefore becomes an issue 
that affects standing. Or, stated differently, the beneficiaries issue is potentially 
sucked into the property inquiry, thereby creating a vortex effect, located in the 
property question, not unlike the arbitrariness vortex Roux described. 
In so far as the decision in the Shoprite Checkers case can be said to create a 
vortex effect, it would be a step backwards in the development of section 25 doctrine 
on beneficiaries. It appeared as if the FNB decision had settled the question whether 
corporate juristic persons benefit from the protection of section 25 reasonably clearly, 
on the basis of principled reasoning deriving its force from the constitution and other 
contextual considerations, and if the effect of the Shoprite Checkers decision is to 
suck the beneficiaries issue into a property vortex, that would destroy the measure 
of clarity and certainty that the FNB case had established on this point. Since the 
beneficiaries issue is in fact a reasonably straightforward one that can be cleared up 
with a relatively large degree of certainty, with reference to section 8(4) and earlier 
case law, it arguably serves no purpose to open the matter up again by discarding 
what appeared to be reasonably clear and sensible guidelines and rendering future 
doctrinal development subject to analysis in a different part of the section 25 
challenge. Such a development would be particularly problematic if it proved to 
open the beneficiaries issue up, as far as corporate juristic persons are concerned, to 
reconsideration in every individual case, based on the “worthiness” of the particular 
claimant’s property interest. Since the FNB case decided the beneficiaries issue, 
as far as corporate juristic persons are concerned, in a principled, contextually 
reasoned analysis that relied on relevant constitutional provisions, the constitutional 
and social context and function of section 25, and since it was framed in a way that 
64 the City of Tshwane case (n 62) par 112, 160 (majority judgment); 53-55 (minority judgment).
65 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 (CC). For a discussion of the 
Shoprite Checkers case see Rautenbach “Dealing with the social dimensions of the right to property 
in the South African bill of rights” 2015 TSAR 822 826-827.
66 The vortex effect of the Shoprite Checkers decision is discussed in more detail in the section on 
property below.
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provides a clear and useful abstract guideline for future cases, there seems to be no 
reason to discard the result reached in that decision and embark on a different route, 
as suggested by the Shoprite Checkers decision, that could potentially subject the 
beneficiaries question to something like a property vortex.
3.3 Property 
In the FNB case the property question was treated neither as a threshold issue, 
nor as a secondary issue that is sucked into the arbitrariness vortex. Instead, as is 
argued in section 2 above, the court dealt with the property question in a principled 
manner, relying on constitutional and contextual factors outside of section 25 in its 
analysis of the question whether a particular property interest should be recognised 
as property for purposes of section 25. The property interest at stake in the FNB 
case (corporeal movables) was unproblematic, but the indication was that extensions 
of the category of interests to be recognised as property, beyond that which is 
traditionally recognised as property in private law, would require principled and 
contextual analysis of the kind set out in the FNB case.
This trend was continued in a number of important subsequent decisions. As 
could be expected, the property question does not require much analysis in cases 
dealing with ownership of land and corporeal movables,67 or cases dealing with real 
rights in private law, such as servitudes in land.68 In a few instances the court relied 
on some contextual analysis of constitutional and social considerations, much in the 
way that the court did in the FNB case, when deciding the property issue.69 However, 
the majority of decisions after the FNB case spent little time on contextual analysis, 
even when the court had to decide whether to include a property interest that has 
not been considered in a constitutional challenge before.70 In some instances, the 
court simply assumed that the interest in issue was property, without deciding it, 
because a decision on the point would not affect the outcome of the case because 
67 In the Du Toit case (n 33) it was contested whether the property at stake was a right to use land 
temporarily or movable corporeal property (gravel) removed from that land, but the court did not 
spend any time on the property question. Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 
2005 1 SA 530 (CC); Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC); Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town 
City 2015 2 SA 584 (CC) and the City of Tshwane case (n 62) dealt with ownership of land and 
owners’ entitlements to use their land; none of these spent any time on the property question.
68 The clearest decision to date on real rights in land is a high court decision: Ex parte Optimal Property 
Solutions CC 2003 2 SA 136 (C) par 19 (restrictive conditions, compared to praedial servitudes).
69 Admittedly, in some instances the contextual analysis was not primarily aimed at answering 
the property question but elicited by another related issue, such as the constitutional purpose of 
protecting property. See eg the Reflect-All case (n 67), which dealt with ownership of land and the 
use entitlements of landowners and the court simply assumed that this is property for s 25 purposes, 
although it refers to the constitutional, social and historical context of the protection of property in 
par 30-32. In Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd v Gründlingh 2007 6 SA 350 (CC) par 34-38 the 
court’s primary focus was not the property question – it accepted for argument’s sake that goodwill 
might be property protected by s 25 – but rather whether a particular development of the common 
law of delict was justified to protect that property interest. In view of a principled analysis that 
considered a range of rights in their constitutional and social context the court decided that the 
claimed development of the common law would have the effect of immunising one party’s property 
rights against competition, which is not what s 25 is intended to do.
70 Without much discussion, the court has accepted that a trade mark is s 25 property: Laugh it Off 
Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International 
(Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2006 1 SA 144 (CC). Compare the supreme 
court of appeal decision in British American Tobacco South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Health 
(463/11) 2012 ZASCA 107 (20 June 2012).
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the alleged deprivation would not be arbitrary in any event. 71 In others, the reason 
for this lack of in-depth analysis is that the property issue was settled in earlier 
case law or in foreign law. However, even when the property issue was ignored or 
dealt with summarily, none of these decisions creates a strong impression that the 
property issue was either decided or avoided under the effect of an arbitrariness 
vortex. Arguably, judicial avoidance in the form of failing to reach a firm decision 
on the property issue because it is clear from the outset that the alleged deprivation 
of that property interest would not be arbitrary does not necessarily confirm the 
arbitrariness vortex thesis any more than avoiding the clear right issue does in an 
interdict application where it is clear from the outset that there is an alternative 
remedy available; or avoiding the peaceful and undisturbed possession issue when 
it is clear from the outset that the alleged spoliation was not unlawful because it was 
properly authorised by law. The lines may sometimes become blurry, but one should 
not be overly hasty in identifying an example of Roux’s arbitrariness vortex when 
Occam’s razor would suggest an equally valid and more straightforward explanation 
in the form of judicial expediency.
In the Opperman case72 the court decided that the right to recover money paid 
(on the basis of unjustified enrichment) was property for purposes of section 25. 
The right to claim restitution on the basis of enrichment is a personal right, and up 
to that point, the court had not yet decided whether personal rights emanating from 
contract, delict, or enrichment are property under section 25. Without extensive 
contextual constitutional and social analysis, relying in part on foreign law, the 
court simply decided that 
“[i]n the circumstances of this case, the recognition of the right to restitution of money paid, based 
on unjustified enrichment, as property under section 25(1) is logical and realistic. It would be in 
accordance with developments in other jurisdictions where personal rights have been recognised 
as constitutional property. Intangible property has become important in modern-day society and 
71 In the Law Society case (n 33) par 84 the court assumed, but found it unnecessary to decide, that a 
delictual claim for loss of earning capacity or support is property. The claim was that s 17(4)(c) of 
the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, as amended by the Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 
19 of 2005, by limiting the amount of compensation that the Road Accident Fund is obliged to pay 
for claims for loss of income or a dependant’s loss of support arising from the bodily injury or death 
of a victim of a motor accident, engages s 25(1) when it causes medical costs, reduces or destroys 
earning capacity and cuts off dependants’ support from their breadwinners. The argument was that 
the medical costs incurred, reduced or lost earning capacity and loss of support constitute a bundle 
of rights and assets or rights with a monetary value, or new property, all of which are protected as 
property by s 25 (par 81). The court declined the opportunity to decide this property issue because 
it had already decided, on a challenge that was unconnected to s 25, that the regulatory scheme 
was rational, and thus there was no chance that the effect of the same scheme could constitute 
arbitrary deprivation of property: par 86. Extensive analysis of the property issue was therefore 
unnecessary, but in par 83 the court did state the following: “For present purposes let it suffice to 
state that the definition of property for purposes of constitutional protection should not be too wide 
to make legislative regulation impracticable and not too narrow to render the protection of property 
of little worth. In many disputes, courts will readily find that a particular asset of value or resource 
is recognised and protected by law as property. In other instances, determinations will be contested 
or prove elusive.”
72 National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) par 63-64. S 89(5)(c) of the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005 rendered money-lending transactions by unregistered credit providers void 
and declared any common law enrichment claim that the lender might have to recover the unpaid 
debt forfeit to the state. See further on the Opperman decision Van der Walt “Constitutional property 
law” 2013 ASSAL 221.
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property should not be so narrowly interpreted as to diminish the worth of the protection given by 
section 25.”73 
In the Cool Ideas case74 the court followed its decision in the Opperman case,75 
without further discussion, and confirmed that an enrichment claim is property for 
purposes of section 25. In the Chevron case76 the court had little trouble in deciding 
that money at hand77 was property for purposes of section 25. 
The first decision since the FNB case in which the property question again 
received in-depth attention from the constitutional court was the Shoprite Checkers 
case,78 which not only did not allow the property question to be sucked into an 
arbitrariness vortex but in fact turned Roux’s arbitrariness vortex thesis on its head 
and potentially created a property vortex, which threatens to suck all other aspects 
of the section 25 challenge, including the arbitrariness issue, into the property 
inquiry. This vortex effect was created in two different ways in two of the separate 
judgments. The judgment of Froneman J causes a potential vortex effect by adopting 
a normative-constitutional approach to the interpretation of section 25 as a whole, in 
terms of which the property question assumes the form of a “deserving-property” 
inquiry. Froneman J explains his approach in the following terms:
“The question of property is fiercely contested in South African society. There is, as yet, little 
common ground on how we conceive of property under section 25 of the Constitution, why we 
should do so, and what purpose the protection of property should serve. This exposes a potential 
fault line that may threaten our constitutional project. This judgment suggests that our evolving 
conversation on this issue should continue to seek our conception of property within the framework 
of values and individual rights in the Constitution. It further asserts that the level of constitutional 
protection should depend on the kind of constitutional interest involved and the core purpose 
associated with that type of property interest.”79 
At a later point in the judgment, Froneman J explains80 that the kind of property 
that deserves section 25 protection should be determined in accordance with the 
founding constitutional values of dignity, freedom and equality81 and other, related 
rights that are protected by the constitution, such as dignity.82 The goal should be 
to seek a conception of property that is rooted in the constitution itself, within 
the normative framework of the fundamental values and individual rights in the 
constitution. For this purpose, it is necessary to extend the conception of property “to 
embrace constitutional entitlements beyond the original ambit of private common 
 
 
73 the Opperman case (n 72) par 63.
74 Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard 2014 4 SA 474 (CC) par 38. See further on the Cool Ideas decision 
Rautenbach 2014 LitNet Akademies 171-188; Van der Walt “Constitutional property law” 2014 
ASSAL 195 196-199.
75 In the context of the Housing Consumers Protection Measures Act 95 of 1998.
76 Chevron SA (Pty) Ltd v Wilson t/a Wilson’s Transport 2015 (10) BCLR 1158 (CC) par 16.
77 The phrase “money at hand” refers to money that the complainant had in its account and would 
have had to pay to someone else in terms of the impugned s 89(5)(b) of the National Credit Act 34 of 
2005. To the extent that “money at hand” practically always refers to money in a bank account – and 
therefore a personal right against the bank – the doctrinal difference between the decisions in the 
Opperman and Chevron cases is negligible.
78 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65). See further on the Shoprite Checkers decision Van der Walt (n 62).
79 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 4.
80 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 44.
81 s 1(a) of the constitution.
82 s 10 of the constitution, read with s 7 and 39(1)(a).
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law property [so as to] ensure that the property clause does not become an obstacle 
to the transformation of our society, but central to its achievement”.83 Like the 
FNB case, the Froneman judgment therefore strives to interpret section 25 within a 
normative, contextual framework that takes into account the constitutional and the 
social, historical and economic considerations that are relevant to the constitutional 
purpose and meaning of section 25. The two normative-contextual explanations of 
section 25’s constitutional framework are strikingly similar.
Froneman J’s comments in the Shoprite Checkers case seem to lean towards 
expanding the private-law notion of property so as to facilitate the protection of a 
wider range of property-related interests that are important to transformation. To 
that extent, the judgment seems to start out from the same point of departure as the 
FNB judgment, assuming that private-law property qualifies as section 25 property 
and allowing for the possibility that this protection might be extended to a wider 
range of property interests for constitutionally and contextually justified reasons. 
One might therefore expect the rest of the judgment to consider types of property 
that are not necessarily protected as property in private law but that deserve 
section 25 protection for some constitutionally or contextually justified reason, but 
instead it focuses on the role that property plays in the promotion of non-property 
constitutional rights and objectives. As a consequence, the judgment potentially 
does not expand, but in fact restricts the notion of property to “deserving property” 
interests that serve the normative constitutional goal of promoting socially-situated 
individual self-fulfilment, as appears from the following passage:84 
“The objective normative values of the Constitution thus require us to determine what kind of 
property deserves protection under the property clause, by reference to the Constitution itself. 
The fundamental values of dignity, equality and freedom necessitate a conception of property that 
allows, on the one hand, for individual self-fulfilment in the holding of property, and, on the other, 
the recognition that the holding of property also carries with it a social obligation not to harm 
the public good. The function that the protection of holding property must thus, broadly, serve is 
the attainment of this socially-situated individual self-fulfilment. The function of personal self-
fulfilment in this sense is not primarily to advance economic wealth maximisation or the satisfaction 
of individual preferences, but to secure living a life of dignity in recognition of the dignity of others. 
And where the holding of property is related to the exercise, protection or advancement of particular 
individual rights under the Bill of Rights, the level of the protection afforded to that holding will be 
stronger than where no relation of that kind exists.” 
Recognition for section 25 purposes of the property interest at stake in the Shoprite 
Checkers case – a so-called grocer’s wine licence that allows the holder to sell table 
wine off the shelf in a grocer’s shop – is a complex and difficult issue because 
the grocer’s wine licence, like all licences, originates from state approval and its 
continuation and exercise depend on state regulation.85 As all three judgments in the 
Shoprite Checkers case pointed out, licences in this respect resemble other interests 
that also originate in state grant, such as social and welfare rights, with which they 
have since the famous Reich article been lumped together under the somewhat 
misleading label of “new property”.86 
83 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 46.
84 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 50. Cf Rautenbach (n 65) 827.
85 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 58. 
86 Reich “The new property” 1964 Yale LJ 733-787. Cf Van der Walt “Protecting social participation 
rights within the property paradigm: a critical reappraisal” in Cook (ed) II Modern Studies 
in Property Law (2003) 27-41 for a critical evaluation of the applicability of the notion of “new 
property” in South African constitutional law.
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
SECTION 25 VORTICES 603
[ISSN 0257 – 7747] TSAR 2016 . 4
To some extent, Froneman J’s analysis of the property question in the Shoprite 
Checkers case, in the context of the normative-constitutional framework he 
develops, was inspired by the difficulty of recognising licences as constitutional 
property, but the problem of recognising the grocer’s wine licence as constitutional 
property was not what caused the potential vortex in this judgment. In principle, 
casting the property question into the form of a “deserving-property” requirement 
against the backdrop of a normative-constitutional goal such as promoting socially-
situated individual self-fulfilment, as Froneman J did, would have a vortex effect 
regardless of the kind of property interest that is at stake. If the applicant has to 
prove, as an initial threshold requirement before section 25 protection is triggered, 
that her property interest deserves section 25 protection because it serves broader, 
normative-constitutional goals – such as socially-situated individual self-fulfilment 
– in a way that pre-empts a particular balancing of individual interests and the 
public interest, it seems inevitable that the balancing of individual interests and 
the public interest that is inherent to the whole of section 25 will be prefigured, 
and potentially completed, during the property inquiry of the section 25 challenge 
rather than during any other inquiry such as deprivation or arbitrariness. Stated 
differently, once it has been decided that a particular property interest deserves 
section 25 protection because it serves a normative-constitutional goal that involves 
or requires a suitable balancing between individual interests and the public interest, 
it becomes unnecessary to analyse other aspects of the section 25 challenge such as 
deprivation or arbitrariness that involve the same balance. In short, the whole of the 
section 25 challenge is sucked into the property question, which therefore acquires 
a real vortex effect.
In the Shoprite Checkers case, Froneman J managed to avoid this property vortex 
effect. The property vortex might possibly have surfaced in a number of different 
ways in the decision, but in the particular case its most obvious effect would have 
been to exclude claimants, particularly corporate juristic persons, who could not 
prove that their property interests were “deserving property” because it is unlikely, 
if not impossible, that the commercial property interests of corporate holders could 
serve “socially-situated individual self-fulfilment”. Froneman J avoided this outcome 
by imagining an individual natural person who holds the same grocer’s wine licence 
under comparable circumstances and who would have been similarly affected by 
the statutory amendment that terminated that kind of licence. Such an individual 
property holder’s interest in the wine licence would satisfy the requirement that it 
protects the holder’s “socially-situated individual self-fulfilment” and therefore – 
in an abstract constitutional challenge, and taking into account the analysis of the 
beneficiaries issue in the FNB case, the fact that licences of this kind are considered 
constitutional property in some foreign jurisdictions, and that the grocer’s wine 
licence displays certain features that would qualify it as a property-type interest 
– Froneman J decided that the licence qualifies as property for purposes of section 
25.
87
The vortex effect of property analysis in the Shoprite Checkers case is even 
clearer from the (on this point dissenting) judgment of Moseneke DCJ, who rejected 
the normative-constitutional framework of the Froneman judgment, arguing that 
the objective, inherent value of an interest should be considered to determine 
whether it constitutes property, and concluded that a grocer’s wine licence does 
not constitute property for purposes of section 25. Taking his cue from the FNB 
87 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 61-70.
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approach, Moseneke DCJ considered this analysis to apply only to interests that are 
not recognised as property at common law, customary law or in legislation, with 
the result that the court must decide “whether extending constitutional protection 
to the interest would be consistent with the Bill of Rights, having regard to the 
values underlying the final Constitution”.88 The courts have cautiously, case by case, 
recognised ownership of or interests in certain real or incorporeal personal rights as 
property for purposes of section 25, and the question in the Shoprite Checkers case 
was to decide “whether what has been termed ‘new property’ should be recognised 
for the purposes of section 25, and further, whether a distinction must be made 
between these various forms of incorporeal property”.89 Judging from an overview 
of foreign case law, Moseneke DCJ concluded that 
“[e]ven if one is inclined to extend constitutional protection to ‘new property’, not all government 
largesse can be seen as ‘property’ and that even if this Court were to push the boundaries of our 
notions of property, liquor licences might not be the ideal type of government largesse with which 
to push the boundaries, nor the ideal factual matrix within the category of ‘licences’”.90
One could debate Moseneke DCJ’s argument concerning recognition of so-called 
“new property” as property for purposes of section 25,91 the place of licences in 
that broad category and the differences between various kinds of licences, but the 
vortex effect of the (on this point) dissenting judgment’s property analysis is clearer 
from its line of reasoning than from the Froneman judgment. Moseneke DCJ argued 
that “[i]f a liquor licence is seen as ‘property’ then a strong entitlement is created 
in the hands of the licence holder. This would tip the scales and arguably diminish 
the ability of the Legislature to effectively regulate an industry where regulation 
is of paramount importance”.92 An important consideration is therefore whether 
recognition of a liquor licence as constitutional property would render the definition 
of property too wide and make legislative regulation impracticable.93 The wider the 
definition of property, the tighter the understanding of deprivation and arbitrariness 
would have to be to prevent every change in a licensing law from attracting a 
constitutional challenge on the basis of section 25. A wide understanding of property 
that includes licences would also raise the question whether a termination of licences 
amounts to expropriation that entitles former holders of licences to compensation.94 
In other words, rather than decide whether every regulatory interference with a 
liquor licence constitutes arbitrary deprivation or even expropriation that requires 
compensation, Moseneke DCJ would not recognise these licences as property in 
the first place and allow the executive and the administration the necessary leeway 
to regulate the licencing scheme according to the applicable legislative framework, 
leaving aggrieved licence holders to litigate alleged infringements on the basis of 
administrative law. In this way, the potentially complex rationality or proportionality 
analysis that would have been necessary in the arbitrariness stage of a property 
challenge (or eventually in an expropriation challenge) is avoided by sucking the 
whole issue into the property inquiry and deciding upfront that there is no protected 
property interest to begin with. 
88 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 104, citing Roux and Davis (n 7) 20-15.
89 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 108.
90 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 110-113.
91 In this regard see eg Van der Walt (n 86) 27-41.
92 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 120.
93 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 124.
94 the Shoprite-Checkers case (n 65) par 125.
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This approach would have a true vortex effect. In all cases where the property 
interest at stake is not recognised or treated as property at common law, customary 
law or in legislation, the courts would be free to decide that there is no property interest 
to begin with and leave the applicant to rely on her remedies in administrative law, 
rather than find a protected property interest and subsequently (in the deprivation 
or arbitrariness inquiry) balance out the protection of the individual interest and the 
public interest in the regulatory project. Since many of the property interests that 
resemble the grocer’s wine licence in the Shoprite Checkers case originate in or are 
subject to extensive regulatory legislation, this approach would make the property 
vortex the default judicial position in a significant, and economically important, 
sector of the economy. Considering the constitutional court’s hesitancy in deciding 
whether the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 applies to section 25-
type cases, combined with the fact that the regulation of this kind of property interests 
is often effected directly by legislation and not through intervening administrative 
action, which creates a complex set of questions about the applicability of the act, it 
is a moot question whether the property vortex that might result from this approach 
would undermine the constitutional protection that the affected holders of heavily 
regulated property enjoy. Apart from administrative justice, it even seems possible 
that the vortex effect of this approach might force affected holders to resort to the 
equality provision for constitutional protection. 
3.4 Deprivation and expropriation
Two aspects of the post-FNB case law deserve mention, namely the potentially 
vortex-creating definition of deprivation that was mooted in one constitutional 
court decision soon after the FNB case and followed in most other decisions, but 
without any real vortex effect; and the fact that Roux’s prediction concerning the 
undermining of the arbitrariness vortex effect in expropriation cases was confirmed 
by subsequent case law.
In the Mkontwana case the deprivation issue was not in dispute,95 and the 
court explicitly relied on the FNB decision for its approach to deprivation, but 
Yacoob J nevertheless formulated a narrower definition of deprivation that could, 
if applied strictly, suck the whole property challenge into the deprivation inquiry 
because it apparently locates a significant part of the process of striking a proper 
balance between the protection of individual interests and the public interest in 
the determination of whether a deprivation “goes beyond normal restrictions on 
property”:
“Whether there has been a deprivation depends on the extent of the interference with or limitation 
of use, enjoyment or exploitation. It is not necessary in this case to determine precisely what 
constitutes deprivation. No more need be said than that at the very least, substantial interference or 
limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property use or enjoyment found in an open 
and democratic society would amount to deprivation.”96
95 the Mkontwana case (n 67). All parties agreed that the challenged provisions, s 118(1) of the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and s 50(1)(a) of the Gauteng Local Government 
Ordinance 17 of 1939, bring about a deprivation of property: par 32.
96 the Mkontwana case (n 67) par 32. See Van der Walt “Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness 
test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government and Housing, 
Gauteng” 2005 SALJ 75-89.
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In a concurring judgment, O’Regan J focused on the fact that the impugned legislation 
does not deprive affected owners of their ownership of land, but only of one of the 
incidents of ownership, namely the ability to alienate their immovable property.97 
Although she used the terminology of Yacoob J’s judgment, O’Regan J cautioned 
that it would defeat the purposes of section 25(1) if the notion of deprivation were 
understood too narrowly.98 However, the point (and effect) of O’Regan J’s wider 
definition of deprivation was not to move the court away from Yacoob J’s normal-in-
an-open-and-democratic-society definition of deprivation but to ensure that partial 
deprivations that affect just one of a landowner’s entitlements are included in the 
definition of deprivation. Considering the importance of the entitlement to dispose 
of property and the effect that the statutory prohibition on alienation may have, 
she concluded that the relevant section does constitute a deprivation of property 
for purposes of section 25(1) because “[s]uch an impairment of the right to alienate 
property is neither trivial, nor is there any suggestion by the litigants that such 
limitations are ordinarily imposed by most open and democratic societies.”99 The 
idea that impairment of just one of a landowner’s entitlements might be sufficient 
to establish a deprivation was followed in the Reflect-All case.100 To that extent, the 
Mkontwana case is authority for expanding the definition of deprivation. However, 
to the extent that it defined deprivation with reference to what is perceived as normal 
in an open and democratic society, the Mkontwana decision at least potentially 
restricts the notion of deprivation to something significantly narrower than the wide 
definition used in the FNB case, since it would exclude from section 25 review 
all regulatory interferences with property that are perceived as normal in an open 
and democratic society: land-use and planning regulation; regulatory control over 
the use of potentially dangerous property such as motor vehicles or firearms; and 
of course regulation of all licences and permits. A literal interpretation of the 
Mkontwana definition would have restricted deprivation to just those deprivations 
that are not to be expected in an open and democratic society; in other words, just 
those excessive and disproportionate deprivations that would have failed the section 
36 justification test.
In subsequent cases the constitutional court routinely refers to its discussion of 
deprivation in the Reflect-All case,101 where it cited both the FNB and Mkontwana 
decisions and concluded that a narrow interpretation of deprivation was undesirable 
and that a deprivation merely had to be significant. However, subsequent decisions 
cite the Mkontwana definition without comment on, and apparently without abiding 
by, the notion that only those interferences with private property that exceed what is 
to be expected as normal in an open and democratic society qualify as deprivations. 
The implication of that narrow definition, namely that any regulatory interference 
with property that is to be expected in an open and democratic society would in 
principle be insulated against section 25(1) scrutiny, seems to have consistently 
escaped the court’s notice.102 At most, the post-Mkontwana decisions seem to focus 
on the idea that a deprivation must be legally significant in the sense of not being de 
minimis. In the Shoprite Checkers case the court explained, in what is the clearest 
97 the Mkontwana case (n 67) par 84-91.
98 the Mkontwana case (n 67) par 89.
99 the Mkontwana case (n 67) par 91.
100 the Reflect-All case (n 67) par 38.
101 the Reflect-All case (n 67) par 36, referring to O’Regan J’s minority judgment in the Mkontwana case 
par 89.
102 See Van der Walt (n 96) 75-89.
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formulation of this Mkontwana-inspired deprivation test, that deprivation requires 
an interference with property that is significant enough to “have a legally relevant 
impact on the rights of the affected party”.103 Apparently, what was a strikingly 
narrow definition with a potentially sweeping vortex effect in the Mkontwana 
decision now seems to be associated simply with the much less restrictive – and 
actually common-sense – observation that deprivation must be significant enough 
to be legally relevant. There is no significant difference between the FNB definition 
and this refinement of it.
The result is that, instead of a narrow test that would exclude all but the most 
excessive and abnormal deprivations of property, the FNB test is generally still 
followed, making it clear that a deprivation must be legally significant, in other 
words not de minimis, to trigger section 25. This has prevented the Mkontwana 
definition from having a vortex effect that would suck the whole section 25 challenge, 
and particularly the arbitrariness test and the section 36 justification stage, into the 
deprivation inquiry. In the Chevron case104 the court followed the phraseology of the 
narrow Mkontwana definition of deprivation fairly closely, but nevertheless decided 
that “ordering the refund of money that a credit provider has already received is a 
deprivation”, without reflecting on the question whether such a statutory obligation 
to refund goes beyond what is expected in an open and democratic society. 
Roux’s suggestion that the arbitrariness vortex might not affect cases in which the 
courts find it necessary or desirable to go to expropriation issues (either FNB question 
5 or question 6) directly, instead of via the non-arbitrariness and justification route,105 
was borne out in a number of cases. The case law can be classified according to 
four different approaches. Some decisions simply confirm Roux’s suggestion and go 
straight to one of the technical expropriation issues such as compensation. In the Du 
Toit case106 the question was whether the compensation award, to be paid in terms 
of section 12 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 for an expropriation under section 
8 of the National Roads Act 54 of 1971, was just and equitable in accordance with 
the requirement in section 25(2) and 25(3) of the constitution. To decide how the 
compensation should be calculated and whether the award was just and equitable the 
court went straight to section 25(2)-(3) and its implications for the relevant statutory 
provisions and did not indulge in deprivation or arbitrariness analysis at all.107
A second group of cases seem to be (and are pleaded as) expropriation cases, 
but the courts nevertheless consider the deprivation issue relatively extensively 
because it is not clear or undisputed that they indeed turn on one of the technical 
expropriation questions. For instance, the Offit case108 started out as an effort to 
either block an alleged intended expropriation or to force the relevant state body 
to proceed with threatened but not realised expropriation, but in the supreme court 
of appeal the challenge morphed into the question whether the continued threat 
of expropriation constituted arbitrary deprivation of property, and consequently 
the constitutional court considered and decided the section 25(1) deprivation issue. 
Following the Mkontwana case and holding that a deprivation has to be at least 
“a substantial interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions 
103 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 73, citing the Reflect-All case (n 67) par 35-36; followed in the 
City of Tshwane case (n 62) par 167.
104 the Chevron case (n 76) par 17-18.
105 Roux (n 3) 46-24.
106 the Du Toit case (n 33).
107 the Du Toit case (n 33) par 16-24.
108 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2011 1 SA 293 (CC).
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on property use and enjoyment”,109 the court concluded that neither the forceful 
bargaining tactics nor the empty threats of expropriation of the relevant state body 
constituted a deprivation.110 
In a third group of cases, of which the Agri SA case111 is the clearest and most 
important, it is not obvious that there has been an expropriation either and therefore 
one might expect the court to start off with the deprivation question and only later 
establish, according to the FNB methodology, whether the deprivation amounted to 
an expropriation. However, in line with Roux’s analysis, this does not always happen 
when the distinction between deprivation and expropriation is in dispute. In the Agri 
SA case the claimant brought the case as a claim for compensation for expropriation. 
Moreover, the parties agreed that there had been a deprivation of property in terms 
of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002; that the 
deprivation was not arbitrary; and that it “rose to the level of expropriation”.112 
The constitutional court dismissed the supreme court of appeal’s finding that the 
claimant had not been deprived of anything and went straight on to the expropriation 
issue.113 Taking as its point of departure the assumption that “[t]here can be no 
expropriation in circumstances where deprivation does not result in property being 
acquired by the state”,114 the court concluded that the claimant in this particular 
case had not been expropriated.115 The decision does not establish authority for the 
proposition that cases that are brought on the basis of claims for compensation for 
expropriation shall be decided on the basis of section 25(2) and 25(3) – the court did 
not avoid considering the deprivation issue completely and the arbitrariness issue 
was ignored only because the parties agreed that the deprivation was not arbitrary. 
However, the decision does indicate that cases that come to court on the basis of a 
claim for compensation for expropriation might be decided largely on the technical 
section 25(2)-(3) expropriation issues if the claimant does not raise the arbitrariness 
issue, even when it is not obvious that the case deals with a formal expropriation 
at all. Similarly, in the Arun case116 the court held that the impugned section 28 of 
the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (Western Cape), which provides for 
development contributions (without compensation) for roads infrastructure that are 
necessitated by the particular development and apparently also for so-called excess 
contributions, must be given “a meaning that is at peace with section 25(2) of the 
Constitution”. In other words, even though this is not made clear by the relevant 
legislation, the compulsory acquisition of excess land is treated as an expropriation 
that needs to be reconciled with the requirements in section 25(2) of the constitution 
by subjecting it to a compensation obligation. Consequently, the court does not 
indulge in deprivation analysis at all but goes directly to the expropriation issues.
There are few clear examples of a fourth category of cases, where the court in 
fact follows the full analysis foreseen in the FNB case, starting with deprivation 
109 the Offit case (n 108) par 41 42.
110 the Offit case (n 108) par 43-46.
111 Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC). See further on the Agri SA 
decision Van der Walt (n 72) 226-230.
112 the Agri SA case (n 111) par 24, 46, 53.
113 the Agri SA case (n 111) par 50-54.
114 the Agri SA case (n 111) par 59.
115 the Agri SA case (n 111) par 72. The court left the possibility open that expropriation in terms of the 
act may be proven in another case: par 75.
116 the Arun case (n 67) par 40-41. On the Arun case see further Slade “Compensation for what? An 
analysis of the outcome in Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City 2015 2 SA 584 
(CC)” 2016 PELJ; Van der Walt (n 74) 206-215.
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and from there proceeding to expropriation. In the Reflect-All case the court first 
determined that the deprivation of property brought about by section 10 of the 
Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act 8 of 2001 was not arbitrary and then decided 
that the relevant sections do not constitute expropriation of property either.117 Given 
the decision that the deprivation did not amount to expropriation, the court did 
not subject the expropriation to justification analysis. In Nhlabathi v Fick118 the 
land claims court did apply the full FNB test through all its stages, ending with 
the question whether the non-consensual appropriation of a grave as either a non-
compliant deprivation or a non-compliant expropriation could be saved by section 
36 justification analysis. Considering the question whether the non-consensual 
burial rights created in favour of farm labourers in section 6(2)(dA) of the Extension 
of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997, the court worked its way through the full 
section 25 test set out in the FNB case,119 first establishing that the appropriation 
of a grave by an occupier will deprive the landowner of property but that section 
6(2)(dA) nevertheless does not authorise arbitrary appropriation of a grave.120 It 
then assumed, without deciding, that the deprivation might also establish a de facto 
expropriation of a servitude over the land, applied the requirements in section 25(2) 
and 25(3) and decided that if section 6(2)(dA) does indeed authorise expropriation 
of a servitude, it either complies with the constitutional requirements (for instance 
if one assumes an implied right to compensation) or, in the absence of provision for 
compensation, it is justifiable in terms of section 36(1) of the constitution.121
3.5 Arbitrariness 
The arbitrariness test set out in the FNB case was applied extensively in only a 
handful of subsequent cases,122 which already suggests that there is less evidence 
of an arbitrariness vortex effect than might have been expected. In some decisions, 
the arbitrariness analysis, at least in the form that was foreseen in the FNB case, 
is downright cursory.123 In addition, the decisions that indulged in arbitrariness 
analysis tended to precede that with some sort of deprivation analysis,124 at least 
when the deprivation was not common cause or obvious.125 Again, in instances 
where the property interest at stake was not something obvious like land, the courts 
also resorted to property analysis.126 Even in expropriation cases such as the Du Toit 
case127 (a right to use land temporarily or a right to remove a certain volume of gravel 
from the land) and the Agri SA case128 (mineral rights, exploitation of minerals, the 
right to prospect and mine, the landowner’s right not to exploit minerals), where the 
117 the Reflect-All case (n 67) par 35-38, 65.
118 (LCC42/02) 2003 ZALCC 9 (8 April 2003).
119 the Nhlabathi case (n 118) par 27-34.
120 the Nhlabathi case (n 118) par 30.
121 the Nhlabathi case (n 118) par 32-34.
122 the Mkontwana case (n 67) par 36-64, 93-123; the Reflect-All case (n 67) par 34-60; the Shoprite 
Checkers case (n 65) par 77-86.
123 the City of Tshwane case (n 62) par 154.
124 See eg the Mkontwana case (n 67) par 32-33 (even though the parties agreed that there was a 
deprivation); the Reflect-All case (n 67) par 35-38; the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 73-76.
125 See eg the Nhlabathi case (n 118) par 30: the deprivation was obvious because the landowner was 
permanently deprived of all use of the relevant piece of land. Compare the Cool Ideas case (n 74) par 
38.
126 See eg the Law Society case (n 33) par 84; the Opperman case (n 72) par 63-64; the Cool Ideas case 
(n 74) par 38; the Chevron case (n 76) par 16; the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 57-72.
127 the Du Toit case (n 33) par 16.
128 the Agri SA case (n 111) par 32-46.
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tendency was to go straight into the expropriation analysis, the court considered the 
exact nature of the property involved; in the Agri SA case the court also analysed 
the deprivation question.129
In the FNB case the court mentioned in passing that a deprivation would be 
arbitrary when the authorising law does not provide sufficient reason for it or is 
procedurally unfair,130 and proceeded to analyse the substantive sufficient-reason 
test without saying anything more about procedural arbitrariness. In subsequent 
case law the notion of procedural arbitrariness in terms of section 25(1) has 
played a minor and inconclusive role. In the Mkontwana case it was argued that 
the authorising legislation was procedurally unfair because it does not oblige 
municipalities to keep landowners informed of debts run up for services delivered 
on their properties, but in a contextual analysis borrowing from administrative law 
the court concluded that municipalities should not be required to furnish owners 
with information on a continuous basis for the law to be procedurally fair.131 In 
the Reflect-All case it was also contended that the impugned legislation authorised 
procedurally arbitrary deprivation because it allowed proclamation of route 
determinations without allowing landowners any process to consider their interests, 
but the court rejected this argument, arguing that the legislative scheme provided 
sufficient opportunities for landowners’ interests to be heard and considered and 
that it was therefore procedurally fair.132 In the Opperman case,133 the court followed 
its earlier judgment in the forfeiture case of Mohunram,134 where it decided that a 
forfeiture law that gives a court no discretion when considering whether to declare 
property forfeit would result in the law authorising arbitrary deprivation of property 
for purposes of section 25(1). This seems to have established the principle that a 
law authorising deprivation might be in conflict with section 25(1) if it leaves the 
court without any discretion whether to allow the deprivation or not, but in addition 
to the brief reference to the Mohunram case the court also applied the FNB test 
for substantive arbitrariness,135 so that it is unclear whether the case was actually 
decided on procedural arbitrariness. The dissenting judgment in the City of Tshwane 
case concluded that the impugned legislative provision was procedurally arbitrary 
because “it places the rights it creates for the licensee above the constitutional rights 
of the landowner without a procedurally fair process”,136 but because of the common 
law framework within which the majority decision interpreted the statutory provision 
it disagreed, holding that the possible deprivation that the section authorises was 
not procedurally or substantively arbitrary.137 It has been argued that the notion of 
procedural arbitrariness in terms of section 25(1) can only make sense if it applies 
to deprivations that do not result from administrative action, since the procedural 
fairness of administrative action should be adjudicated in terms of the Promotion 
129 the Agri SA case (n 111) par 48-53.
130 the FNB case (n 2) par 100.
131 the Mkontwana case (n 67) par 65-67.
132 the Reflect-All case (n 67) par 40-47. 
133 the Opperman case (n 72) par 69.
134 Mohunram v National Director of Public Prosecutions (Law Review Project as Amicus Curiae) 
2007 4 SA 222 (CC) par 121.
135 the Opperman case (n 72) par 68, 70-72.
136 the City of Tshwane case (n 62) par 64. It bears pointing out that s 25(1) proscribes legislation that 
authorises arbitrary deprivation and not law that is arbitrary. Describing the authorising law or the 
actual action that brings about the deprivation as arbitrary is unnecessarily confusing.
137 the City of Tshwane case (n 62) par 154.
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of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA),138 but the constitutional court has 
generally been loath to decide whether the act applies to a particular deprivation 
challenge and the matter has not enjoyed much attention. In general, it cannot be 
said that the notion of procedural arbitrariness has been sufficiently prominent in 
section 25(1) cases to have any kind of vortex effect.
In view of these brief observations it is difficult to uphold any strong version of 
the arbitrariness vortex thesis with reference to post-FNB case law. The arbitrariness 
inquiry does not always feature prominently in section 25 challenges and is sometimes 
bypassed; and even when it does feature prominently it does not necessarily result 
in the courts ignoring or glossing over the property or deprivation inquiry to strike 
the required balance between the protection of individual property interests and the 
public interest in the proportionality-type balancing of the arbitrariness stage.
3.6 Justification 
It has been noted in section 2 above that if it should be decided that section 36 does 
not apply to section 25 rights that would establish a vortex effect to the extent that 
the possibility of justification in terms of section 36 is precluded by the effect of the 
arbitrariness decision. The question is therefore whether the arbitrariness test, as it 
was set out in the FNB case, in fact has such a vortex effect on the justification stage 
of a section 25 challenge.
Ever since the FNB decision the constitutional court (and lower courts) on 
occasion commented on the observation, noted but not decided in the FNB case, that 
it might be impossible or unnecessary to proceed to section 36 justification analysis 
once a court has decided that a particular deprivation of property was arbitrary 
and therefore in conflict with section 25(1) of the constitution.139 In the Shoprite 
Checkers case the court came closest to deciding that justification under section 36 
would be impossible or unnecessary once it has been established that a deprivation 
was arbitrary. However, the court’s somewhat opaque statement to this effect is 
insufficient to establish such a vortex effect:
“The parties are in agreement that if arbitrariness is found under the FNB formulation, justification 
under section 36(1) will be difficult to find. The reason, I think, should now be clear. The nature 
of any infringement of the right to protection of property under section 25(1) is dependent on the 
substantive constitutional or other interest affected. Once the interest is identified and the FNB 
approach to arbitrariness is applied, there can be no further independent infringement that would 
require further justification under section 36.”140
Generally, the court simply follows the FNB approach, namely to acknowledge 
the conceptual difficulty involved in justifying an arbitrary deprivation in terms 
of section 36, given the substantive similarities and overlaps between the factors 
involved in section 25(1) arbitrariness analysis and section 36(1) justification 
analysis, but accepting that section 36 does not exclude any provision in the bill of 
rights and that it therefore applies to section 25, at least in principle. 
In the Nhlabathi case141 the land claims court concluded, without deciding, that 
if an appropriation of a grave site in terms of section 6(2)(dA) of the Extension of 
Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 proved to be in conflict with section 25(2) of the 
138 Van der Walt (n 24) 264-270.
139 the Opperman case (n 72) par 73-75; the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 87; the City of Tshwane 
case (n 62) par 77 (dissenting).
140 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65) par 87.
141 (n 118) par 32-34.
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constitution because it were held to provide for expropriation without compensation, 
the requirements of section 6(2)(dA), particularly the balancing of interests; the 
necessity for an established practice; and the restricted nature of the rights which 
are appropriated; would justify in terms of section 36 of the constitution the absence 
of a statutory right to compensation. The court did not consider the possibility 
that a similar result could have been reached in terms of section 25(2)-(3) itself, in 
the sense that the absence of compensation might in some cases be justified, in a 
proper contextual analysis, by the just-and-equitable-compensation requirement in 
those sections, just as it might be justified by a contextual application of the section 
36 factors. In effect, the court decided that section 36 justification analysis would 
still be possible even if a particular expropriation would limit section 25 rights by 
authorising expropriation that does not comply with at least one of the section 25(2)-
(3) requirements (namely compensation). It is unclear whether the implications of the 
Nhlabathi decision can be generalised to other expropriation requirements such as 
authority and public purpose or public interest, but given the formulation of section 
36 it is more likely that expropriation that fails to satisfy those requirements would 
cause the same problems with section 36 justification as have been noted with regard 
to section 25(1). In the absence of a compensation requirement in section 25(1), the 
Nhlabathi decision does not have any clear-cut implications for the arbitrariness 
vortex thesis. 
In general it is probably fair to say that something like a vortex effect is 
identifiable in the interaction between section 25(1) arbitrariness analysis (first 
stage of a constitutional challenge) and section 36 justification analysis (second 
stage), in that the factors considered for purposes of the two stages overlap to such 
an extent that a decision of section 25(1) arbitrariness in the first stage renders a 
contradictory section 36 justification decision in the second stage highly unlikely, 
if not impossible. Roux’s initial notion of a “telescoping” effect, to indicate that 
the structure of section 25 (as it was interpreted in the FNB case) reduces the 
usual two-stage constitutional inquiry to a single, substantive analysis (whether a 
constitutionally entrenched right has been infringed) that effectively renders the 
second, section 36(1) justification inquiry redundant, is to that extent supported by 
the developing case law.142 However, the Nhlabathi judgment indicates that the same 
might not be true for expropriation in terms of section 25(2)-(3), at least in so far as 
expropriation does not comply with one section 25(2) requirement, namely just and 
equitable compensation.
4 Conclusions: Avoiding the vortex effect
It does not really matter whether – or to what extent – Roux’s arbitrariness 
vortex thesis was proven correct by case law. Its value lies in the accuracy of the 
observation that a tendency to decide the core of a section 25 challenge – striking 
the right balance between the protection of individual property rights and the public 
interest in regulating the use of property – in a way that would focus on just one 
aspect of section 25, and that would consequently render other aspects redundant or 
unimportant, would be a mistake that would negate the contextual and constitutional 
unity and complexity of the section 25 right. 
142 See Roux and Davis (n 7) 20-8, citing De Waal, Currie and Erasmus (n 7) 393-394 (now Currie and 
De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2013) 557).
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The constitutional court has repeatedly emphasised that no single constitutional 
right, and no discrete part of a constitutional rights provision, should be interpreted 
in isolation. Instead, every right, and all parts of a rights provision, must be 
interpreted and applied in the context of the whole provision, seen against the 
backdrop of all the other rights in the bill of rights and the provisions in the rest of 
the constitution, as well as the historical, social, economic and legal context within 
which the constitution and a specific rights provision was adopted.143 In the FNB 
case the court underlined this contextual approach,144 adding with emphasis that 
“[t]he subsections which have specifically to be interpreted in the present case must 
not be construed in isolation, but in the context of the other provisions of section 
25 and their historical context, and indeed in the context of the Constitution as a 
whole.”145 
Arguing from first principles, any approach that would have a vortex effect on 
the interpretation of section 25 must therefore be suspect. At the risk of belabouring 
Roux’s point: if a particular interpretive approach to section 25 results in a vortex 
that consistently causes the core of the section 25 challenge, namely striking the 
constitutionally required balance between the protection of individual property 
rights and the public interest in regulating the use of property, to be located within 
one particular part of section 25, under circumstances where the balance could just 
as well have been struck in another part, or in a combination of all the parts taken 
together, that approach is probably distorting the contextual unity of interpretation 
that the quotation from the FNB decision above refers to.
The singular merit of Roux’s arbitrariness vortex thesis is therefore the fact that 
he identified, in the architecture of the FNB decision, the potential and the danger 
of creating such a vortex effect around the arbitrariness test. As appears from the 
analysis in section 2 above, this potential was particularly clear in two features of 
the FNB decision highlighted by Roux: firstly the seemingly strict genus-species 
relationship between deprivation and expropriation as the FNB case defined them; 
and secondly the problematic overlaps between the two stages of a constitutional 
challenge as it had been defined in earlier constitutional court decisions. Subsequent 
decisions have shown, very much in line with the FNB decision itself, that neither 
the property question nor the deprivation question would necessarily be sucked 
into the arbitrariness vortex – both would be decided on their own contextual merit 
as and when necessary, and when they are in fact judicially avoided or decided 
summarily and without much contextual analysis, that would probably be either 
because the matter had been settled before in older case law, in established private 
law or constitutional doctrine, or in comparative law, or else because of “normal” 
judicial avoidance strategies in instances where a firm decision on one of these 
points would have no effect on the outcome of the case. To a certain extent some 
of these decisions seem to confirm Roux’s arbitrariness vortex thesis in that the 
property or deprivation question is left undecided and the “real” decision is left for 
the arbitrariness inquiry, but the analytical support they provide for the thesis is 
rather weak because of Occam’s razor – the fact that a similar judicial avoidance 
strategy is followed in other areas, on the principle that it is unnecessary to decide 
point A if it would make no difference to an inevitable decision on the subsequent 
point B, suggests that a more general explanation regarding judicial avoidance 
143 See eg S v Makwanyane (n 54) par 10; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 
217 (CC) par 8-23.
144 the FNB case (n 2) par 32, 47-50.
145 the FNB case (n 2) par 49. 
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strategies could explain the outcome equally well, without relying on the vortex 
thesis.
In the area of the relationship between deprivation and expropriation, case law 
after the FNB decision indicates that Roux’s qualification to the vortex thesis was 
accurate, and that courts will bypass the section 25 deprivation inquiry – and with 
it the arbitrariness inquiry – altogether and go straight to the expropriation inquiry 
if it is clear from the outset that the dispute involves either the question whether 
there has been an expropriation that requires compensation, or a technical question 
regarding compliance with one of the expropriation requirements such as the amount 
of compensation. One of the two major areas in which the arbitrariness vortex 
seemed most likely to occur, judging on the basis of the architecture of the section 
25 challenge as it was set out in the FNB case, was thus avoided in subsequent case 
law.
This outcome should not necessarily be met with an unqualified sigh of relief. 
In some of the expropriation cases, notably the Agri SA,146 Arun147 and City of 
Tshwane
148
 cases, the court has displayed a willingness to treat a particular statutory 
interference with private property as expropriation and therefore to bypass section 
25(1) analysis and go straight to expropriation analysis based on section 25(2)-(3), in 
circumstances where the legislation involved does not clearly state the intention or 
the authority to expropriate and where it must have been at least questionable whether 
expropriation was indeed possible and legitimate. Whether judicial acceptance of a 
notion of statutory expropriation is desirable or indeed possible, and how that would 
relate to the equally problematic notion of constructive expropriation, is a question 
for another occasion, but it is worth noting here that it is not clear that judicially 
bypassing the deprivation inquiry and moving straight into the expropriation inquiry 
is jurisprudentially wise – or doctrinally possible – in these instances.
The implications of the arbitrariness vortex thesis for the relationship between 
the two stages of a constitutional challenge is more problematic. On the one hand, 
it should be clear that part of the problem is not caused by any vortex effect caused 
by the FNB case’s interpretation of section 25(1), but simply by the conceptual and 
structural overlap between section 25 and section 36. For instance, a deprivation 
or expropriation that is in conflict with section 25(1) or section 25(2) for not being 
authorised by law of general application can clearly not be justified in terms of 
section 36(1), simply because the latter also allows only limitations caused by law 
of general application to be justified. This has nothing to do with a vortex effect.
In the second place, it is probably fair to say that there is a fair to strong possibility 
that the FNB case’s analysis might cause a vortex effect between the arbitrariness 
inquiry and the possibility of a section 36 justification stage, to the extent that a 
finding of arbitrariness would very likely render any section 36 justification analysis 
redundant for the reasons pointed out earlier. This effect would in fact confirm the 
arbitrariness vortex thesis. However, from the FNB case onwards the court has 
consistently noted this problem but pointed out that section 36 does not exclude 
any rights provision in the bill of rights, and therefore proceeded to what inevitably 
proved to be unsuccessful section 36 justification analysis.
146 (n 111).
147 (n 67) par 40-41.
148 (n 62). In par 149 the court was even willing to treat the ex lege establishment of a common law right 
of way of necessity as a “kind of expropriation” even though there is no common law authority for 
expropriation.
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The fact that the court has consistently refused to simply accept that section 25 
renders section 36 redundant may well be a good thing. Judging from the admittedly 
weakish authority of the Nhlabathi judgment of the land claims court,149 it may 
well be that section 36 justification analysis is not rendered redundant by a finding 
of non-compliance with the expropriation requirements in section 25(2)-(3), and 
particularly with the compensation requirement. It looks possible that a finding 
to the effect that a particular expropriation does not serve a public purpose or 
the public interest would also be impossible to justify in terms of the section 36 
requirements, but the fact that a law of general application authorises expropriation 
in a particular instance without any provision for compensation might well be capable 
of justification, partly because the factors for just and equitable compensation in 
section 25(3) arguably already leave room for the possibility. The court’s argument 
in the Nhlabathi case indicates that such a possibility does exist and therefore it is as 
well to leave room for section 36 justification of a law that does not comply with the 
section 25 requirements, at least in so far as it authorises expropriation and the issue 
revolves around compensation. In the strict FNB version of section 25 analysis, 
where every section 25 challenge starts with the deprivation question, such a law 
would probably have fallen foul of the arbitrariness test in section 25(1), probably 
proved to be non-justifiable in terms of section 36, and have been unconstitutional. 
By separating the section 25(1) and 25(2)-(3) cases from each other in the way 
that post-FNB decisions suggest, and by leaving room for section 36 justification 
in expropriation cases dealing purely with compensation, the arbitrariness vortex 
effect can be escaped altogether.
As appears from the analysis in section 3 above, two post-FNB decisions might 
have a similar vortex effect, if they were followed strictly. From subsequent case 
law it appears as if the potential deprivation vortex that might have been caused 
by the normal-in-an-open-and-democratic-society definition of deprivation in the 
Mkontwana case150 to date has not, and probably will not, materialise because later 
decisions simply read the Mkontwana decision as authority for the proposition that 
a deprivation must be legally significant. It is too early to tell whether the deserving-
property approach that Froneman J proposed in the Shoprite Checkers case151 will 
have any vortex effect, but from the reaction in the dissenting judgments it seems 
unlikely and, even if it does, it might be restricted to rare cases in which relatively 
unusual and contentious property interests are at stake. 
For the moment being, it seems as if section 25 jurisprudence might develop 
further without serious influence from any vortex effect. Assuming that the 
principles of contextual interpretation set out at the beginning of this section above 
are the starting point, the question is, then, how the further development of section 
25 jurisprudence should look and how the threat of vortex effects can be avoided. 
The starting point has to be the principle, set out in the FNB case and quoted at 
the beginning of this section above, that the subsections of section 25 must not be 
construed in isolation, but in the context of the whole of section 25, in their historical 
and social context, and in the context of the constitution as a whole, even when it 
is or seems clear that a particular subsection applies more directly to the case at 
hand than others. In other words, vortices that cause the desired balance between 
the protection of individual property and the public interest in the regulation of the 
use of property to be struck primarily or only on the basis of a single subsection in 
149 the Nhlabathi case (n 118) par 32-34.
150 (n 67).
151 the Shoprite Checkers case (n 65).
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isolation must be avoided. Two strategies seem to be important in avoiding vortices 
and ensuring the contextual interpretation that is required.
Firstly, it is necessary in every single case to at least consider the constitutional, 
historical and social context within which section 25 was promulgated and within 
which it operates. This context has been canvassed extensively in decisions such 
as the FNB, PE Municipality, Agri SA and Shoprite Checkers cases and it is 
unnecessary to repeat those analyses here. Suffice it to say that different aspects 
of the broad context might be more directly relevant in particular cases, and 
sometimes the relevance of this context might seem remote or tenuous, but it has 
to be considered. At the very least, as the FNB case makes clear, considering this 
context is necessary to highlight the tension that characterises the constitutional 
and legal function and character of section 25, between the protection of individual 
property rights and the promotion of the public interest in the regulation of the use 
and enjoyment of property. No section 25 case can be decided without reflection on 
that tension and the balance that the court is consequently required to strike in the 
particular instance.
However, that is not enough. The Shoprite Checkers case could be seen as an 
example of a case where the constitutional court did reflect upon the constitutional, 
historical and social context (as the court did in the FNB case), but then (in contrast 
to the FNB case) arguably did not reflect enough about what comes next. In addition 
to contextualisation, there is also a need for an angle of approach152 that will allow 
working through the different parts of section 25 in a thoughtful way that supports 
rather than undermines the contextual interpretation striven for. It could perhaps 
be said that what Ackermann J aimed for in the FNB case was exactly such a 
contextualised angle of approach, which was arguably undermined in so far as some 
parts of the approach (the genus-species definition of deprivation and expropriation, 
combined with the idea that all section 25 challenges should start with section 
25(1)) acquired the character of a prescriptive technique or methodology – what 
Roux refers to as an algorithm – that in turn created the risk of a vortex. An angle 
of approach would also start out by identifying the different parts of a section 25 
challenge – the FNB questions – and suggest a way of working through them in 
some sort of sequence but, in contrast to parts of the FNB decision, the Mkontwana 
definition of deprivation and the Froneman definition of deserving property in the 
Shoprite Checkers case, it would avoid conceptual, definitional or logical moves 
that would create the risk of vortices. What follows is no more than a few first ideas 
about how such an angle of approach might look.
Firstly, as far as identification of the parts of a section 25 challenge is concerned, 
the FNB list of seven questions is a good starting point. However, with the benefit of 
hindsight it is possible to suggest small amendments to that list in view of subsequent 
case law. An amended list might look something like this:
1. Beneficiaries: is the complainant a beneficiary of section 25 protection?
2. Property: is the alleged property interest constitutional property for purposes 
of section 25?
3. Deprivation or expropriation: is the alleged interference with the protected 
property interest: 
 a. a deprivation of property covered by section 25(1)?
152 This handy phrase is from Botha, who first used it at a workshop in 2007, explaining that it provides a 
starting point and a preliminary direction, while pointedly avoiding the pretence of a technique that 
produces ready or final answers.
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 b. an expropriation of property covered by section 25(2)-(3)?
4a.  Deprivation: if the interference is a deprivation of property, is it:
 a. authorised by law of general application?
 b.  if it is authorised by law of general application, does the law permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property?
4b.  Expropriation: if the interference is an expropriation, is the expropriation:
 a. authorised by law of general application?
 b. for a public purpose or in the public interest?
 c. accompanied by provision for just and equitable compensation?
5.  Justification: if the law of general application
 a.  permits arbitrary deprivation of property
 b.   authorises expropriation without providing for just and equitable 
compensation is,
 it justifiable in terms of section 36(1)?
This amended list is informed by experience from post-FNB case law and therefore 
includes the beneficiaries question as one of the issues to be decided in the contextual 
inquiry; makes provision for an early decision on the issue whether the case deals 
with a deprivation or an expropriation, so that the inquiry can thereafter proceed 
along one of the two alternate lines; and simplifies the justification inquiry in view of 
the (even remote) possibility of successfully justifying a deprivation or expropriation 
that fails certain elements of their respective section 25 tests. Clearly, the idea is 
that every step should start with contextualisation, considering the constitutional, 
historical and social context already identified in earlier cases, but at the same time 
it is possible that every new case does not require that contextualisation for every 
step. Two considerations should play a role in deciding whether, and how much, 
contextualisation is required in a particular case on a particular point.
Firstly, there are certain constitutional baselines that render it unnecessary to 
engage in extensive contextual interpretation on a particular point. These baseline 
positions can generally be taken as a point of departure without further analysis. 
Secondly, these baselines can be expanded upon, clarified or analysed further in 
case law, thus also making it unnecessary to revisit certain points already decided 
in a full contextual analysis in prior decisions. For instance, as far as beneficiaries 
are concerned it is not necessary to decide whether a natural person is a beneficiary 
of the section 25 right – section 25(1) starts off with the words “no one”; the 
section does not qualify its beneficiaries as some other sections do (for instance 
restricting it to citizens); and the general provision in section 7(1) that it “enshrines 
the rights of all our people” therefore applies. Natural persons are beneficiaries of 
the section 25 right as a constitutional baseline and the courts do not have to engage 
in full contextual analysis to come to that conclusion. Juristic persons are more 
problematic, though. Section 8(4) provides the primary constitutional provision 
that regulates the qualification of juristic persons as beneficiaries for the section 25 
right; this provision must be interpreted contextually, as was done in the FNB case, 
to determine whether a particular category of juristic persons is included. Once it 
has been done for a particular category of juristic persons, however, it might be 
unnecessary to go through the whole exercise again, unless there is a particular 
reason to reconsider the matter. Therefore, in view of the City of Tshwane decision 
it is unnecessary to again consider the question whether the state is a beneficiary – it 
is not. Similarly, it is arguably unnecessary to engage in full contextual analysis to 
decide whether corporate commercial juristic persons such as public companies are 
beneficiaries – the FNB case engaged in the full contextual analysis and decided that 
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
TSAR 2016 . 4 [ISSN 0257 – 7747]
618 VAN DER WALT
(and why) they are, and the matter only needs to be reconsidered if there is a good 
reason, for instance when it is unclear whether the particular commercial juristic 
person is in exactly the same position as a public company. There are many other 
issues that have to be cleared up on the beneficiaries issue, for instance the position 
of semi-state bodies and publicly funded, regulated or owned institutions such as 
schools and universities, South African Airways, the SABC and many others.153 If a 
case involving any of these bodies should come up the court would have to engage in 
a contextual analysis, probably similar to that in the FNB case,154 to decide when and 
how the protection of section 25 is to be extended to it on the basis of section 8(4).
Constitutional baselines also exist in other areas of section 25, some created by 
law and others developed in case law. The principle that property interests that are 
traditionally regarded and protected as property in private law are also recognised 
as property for purposes of section 25 is widely established in comparative 
constitutional law, and it was apparently adopted as a constitutional baseline in the 
FNB case, where the court stated that “ownership of a corporeal movable must – as 
must ownership of land – lie at the heart of our constitutional concept of property”.155 
From that baseline the courts can expand and develop the constitutional notion of 
property incrementally, relying on contextual analysis every time when a new 
category of interest is to be considered, so that over time it becomes unnecessary 
to engage in a contextual analysis to decide that a particular interest is recognised 
as property because its recognition had already been established in prior case 
law. Full contextual analysis is therefore reserved for cases dealing with new, and 
particularly difficult, categories such as the grocer’s wine licence in the Shoprite 
Checkers case. The last word has probably not been said on that particular category 
of section 25 property – licences, permits and other interests that originate in, exist 
by the grace of and remain subject to regulatory control – and further analysis is no 
doubt necessary.156 An aspect that has not been clarified sufficiently in the Shoprite 
Checkers case and that deserves further attention is the distinction between licences, 
permits, quotas and similar regulated commercial interests and so-called welfare or 
social participation interests such as pensions, medical benefits and state subsidies. 
Foreign law indicates that the two categories have to be distinguished, despite 
regularly being lumped together under the misleading heading of “new property”; 
that some of these interests should be recognised as constitutional property, 
subject to contextual considerations and conditions, while other should not; and 
that recognition of these interests as constitutional property is jurisdiction-specific, 
based on the age and general tenor of the constitution involved, the structure and 
nature of the statutory framework, and other similar considerations.157 Similar 
considerations may apply when the courts are confronted with the expansion of 
existing recognition of intellectual property rights to other, so far unrecognised 
forms of intellectual property or to other forms of technological property.
It seems that the tendency to distinguish between deprivation and expropriation 
cases and proceed directly to either section 25(1) or section 25(2)-(3), instead of the 
153 Some guidance on this point can be gleaned from foreign law; many aspects have been worked out 
in German constitutional case law: Van der Walt (n 24) 70-72.
154 the FNB case (n 2) par 41-45.
155 the FNB case (n 2) par 51.
156 A good description for this category of constitutional property interests is perhaps “radically 
regulated property”, to indicate that the property interest as a category is regulated to its very roots.
157 Cf generally Van der Walt “The constitutional property clause: striking a balance between guarantee 
and limitation” in MacLean (ed) Property and the Constitution (1999) 109-146; Van der Walt (n 86) 
27-41; Van der Walt (n 24) 150-168.
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FNB proposal that all cases should start with section 25(1), is set to continue. As 
the discussion in section 3 above indicates, this is not a bad thing since it avoids 
at least one vortex. On the other hand, though, it might be necessary at some stage 
to reconsider, on the basis of a proper and full contextual analysis, an issue that 
has been treated rather lightly by the constitutional court in the Agri SA, Arun and 
City of Tshwane cases, namely the fundamental distinction between deprivation and 
expropriation in cases where there is no formal expropriation, but one of the parties 
alleges that the interference with its property was or amounted to expropriation. The 
question is whether the parties to a section 25 challenge should be able to choose 
whether they want the case to be decided in terms of section 25(1) or 25(2)-(3). From 
first principles, this should not be allowed, and the question whether a particular 
case is a section 25(1) or a section 25(2)-(3) case is one that should also be decided 
on the basis of a proper and full contextual analysis. Broadly speaking, this issue 
can come up in three kinds of cases. The first is the regulatory regime changes that 
feature in the Agri SA and Shoprite Checkers cases: the state amends its regulatory 
scheme to such a degree that certain pre-existing rights are abolished and new 
ones are created in their place. The Agri SA decision indicates that state acquisition 
of the lost property is an issue in these cases,158 but declined the opportunity to 
decide whether expropriation should have been the focus of the case at all simply 
because the parties agreed that there was no arbitrary deprivation. In the Arun case 
the court again seems to have decided the case on the basis of compensation for 
expropriation, but it is never clarified whether the acquisition of the excess land 
was really an expropriation. That highlights the second kind of case that deserves 
full contextual analysis: cases, again like Agri SA and Arun, that raise the question 
whether statutory expropriation – in other words, expropriation by the statute itself, 
without administrative or judicial action – is possible in South African law and what 
its scope and requirements are. To date it has been accepted rather easily that a law 
brings about an expropriation if it has the effect of acquiring property for the state 
without formal procedures, but that assumption is surely questionable, at least on 
the issue of authority. That brings to the fore the third kind of issue that deserves 
further inquiry: the question whether constructive expropriation is possible and 
desirable in South African law. The constitutional court has to date mostly avoided 
deciding the issue, but a decision like City of Tshwane,159 where the court flirts with 
the idea that compulsory, ex lege creation of a right of way of necessity is “a kind of” 
expropriation, arguably opens Pandora’s box on this point. It is therefore arguably 
necessary that whenever it is not entirely clear whether a case involves section 25(1) 
deprivation or section 25(2)-(3) the courts should, regardless of what the parties 
argue, engage in a full contextual analysis to decide whether it is dealing with a 
deprivation or an expropriation before proceeding to the step where it considers 
compliance with the respective requirements.
The case law on the deprivation issue seems to have settled a constitutional baseline: 
as long as a deprivation is legally significant in the sense of not de minimis, there 
is a deprivation of the property interest involved. Once it has been established that 
the court is dealing with a deprivation of property, the only question that remains is 
compliance with the section 25(1) requirements. Since the law of general application 
requirement is common to the deprivation, expropriation and justification inquiries, 
and seeing that it is a formal requirement that does not involve much contextual 
158 the Agri SA case (n 111) par 59.
159 the City of Tshwane case (n 62) par 149.
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analysis, it should arguably be separated from the other requirements (in this case 
non-arbitrariness) that do require contextual analysis.
The expropriation inquiry should arguably also be separated into the formal law 
of general application requirement – which would deserve more attention once the 
court has engaged in a full contextual analysis to decide whether it is indeed dealing 
with an expropriation, for which proper statutory authority is required in South 
African law – and the contextual public-purpose/public-interest and compensation 
requirements.
Based on experience in case law, the list above suggests that the justification 
inquiry tends to focus on just two possibilities: a law that permits arbitrary 
deprivation, or a law that either authorises expropriation that is not for a public 
purpose or in the public interest or that does not provide for just and equitable 
compensation. As the analysis in section 3 above indicates, it remains unlikely that 
a law that permits arbitrary deprivation or that authorises expropriation that is not 
for a public purpose or in the public interest can be justified in terms of section 
36, but the Nhlabathi decision suggests that a law that authorises expropriation 
without providing for just and equitable compensation might be justified. For that 
purpose, and in view of the constitutional court’s insistence that section 36 makes 
no exceptions, the justification inquiry should be left open.
Section 25 cases will seldom be easy, but if they are decided on the basis of 
reflective contextual analysis, complemented by established constitutional or 
jurisprudential baselines and structured by an open but direction-giving angle 
of approach like the one suggested here, they should not result in a nightmare of 
confusing and contradictory case law. Given the lack of material it had to work 
with, the FNB decision admirably succeeded in providing a foundation for the way 
forward. However, it is perhaps time for a thorough rethink and a reflective, careful 
course adjustment.
SAMEVATTING
ARTIKEL 25-DRAAIKOLKE
Roux het voorspel dat die grondwetlike hof se FNB-beslissing moontlik ’n draaikolk-effek mag hê 
deurdat al sewe die vrae wat, volgens die beslissing, deur artikel 25 van die grondwet geopper word 
(is daar eiendom vir doeleindes van artikel 25; magtig die reg ’n ontneming van die eiendom; was die 
ontneming arbitrêr soos bedoel word in artikel 25(1); indien nie, is die inbreukmaking regverdigbaar 
ingevolge artikel 36(1); was daar ’n onteiening van die eiendom; was die onteiening in ooreenstemming 
met die vereistes in artikel 25(2)-(3); en indien nie, is die inbreukmaking regverdigbaar ingevolge 
artikel 36(1)?) deur die arbitrêre ontneming-vraag “opgesuig” sal word. Daarmee het Roux bedoel 
dat die kernvraag wat in artikel 25-sake aan die orde kom, naamlik of die gewenste balans tussen 
die beskerming van privaat regte in eiendom en die openbare belang in die regulering van daardie 
eiendom, bereik word, beantwoord word aan die hand van slegs een van die sewe moontlike vrae, 
terwyl dit in werklikheid ook met verwysing na enige van die ander vrae of in ’n kombinasie van die 
vrae beantwoord sou kon word.
Die tweede deel van die artikel analiseer die FNB-beslissing en kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die 
grondwetlike hof, deur ’n kombinasie van ’n wydlopende konteksgerigte analise, normatiewe oordeel 
gegrond op die geheel van artikel 25, en ander grondwetlike regte en bepalings, dit duidelik maak dat ’n 
eng benadering wat op iets soos Roux se draaikolk-effek uitloop grondwetlik ongewens sou wees. Die 
FNB-saak is nie suiwer op grond van die arbitrêre ontneming-vraagstuk beslis nie.
In die derde deel van die artikel word latere regspraak bespreek, en die algemene gevolgtrekking is 
weereens dat die howe inderdaad die draaikolk-effek grotendeels vermy aangesien die meeste sake nie 
suiwer op grond van die arbitrêre ontneming-vraag beslis is nie. Roux se eie voorspelling dat hierdie 
effek in bepaalde gevalle vermy mag word as die howe in sake wat duidelik met onteiening te doen het 
direk op die onteiening-vraagstukke (soos billike vergoeding) sou fokus, eerder as om eers te vra of die 
moontlike gebreke in die onteiening op arbitrêre ontneming neerkom, word korrek bewys deur latere 
regspraak. 
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Die analise van latere regspraak wys egter ook uit dat enkele latere uitsprake self die moontlikheid 
skep van draaikolk-effekte deur die hele artikel 25-konflik suiwer met verwysing na een van die sewe 
FNB-vrae te probeer beslis. Die moontlikheid van só ’n draaikolk-effek rondom die definisie van 
ontneming, na aanleiding van die eng omskrywing van ontneming in die Mkontwana-beslissing, is 
skynbaar tot dusver in die daaropvolgende regspraak vermy. Dit lyk egter asof die onlangse Shoprite 
Checkers-beslissing weer die moontlikheid skep dat die hele artikel 25-konflik op die omskrywing van 
eiendom kan fokus, wat ook ’n draaikolk-effek tot gevolg mag hê.
In die laaste deel van die artikel word standpunt ingeneem teen enige benadering wat ’n draaikolk-
effek mag hê in die sin dat dit ’n artikel 25-konflik suiwer met verwysing na een van die sewe FNB 
-vrae probeer beslis, pleks van om al die vrae in ’n kontekstuele, grondwetlik-georiënteerde geheel 
te oorweeg. ’n Effens aangepaste weergawe van die FNB -lys van vrae word aan die hand gedoen 
waarvolgens só ’n kontekstuele benadering moontlik sal wees.
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